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Leidos and the Roberts Court’s 
Improvident Securities Law Docket 
Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody* 
For its October 2017 term, the U.S. Supreme Court took up a noteworthy 
securities law case, Leidos, Inc. v. Indiana Public Retirement System.1 The legal 
question presented in Leidos was whether a failure to comply with a regulation 
issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Item 303 of 
Regulation S-K (Item 303), can be grounds for a securities fraud claim pursuant 
to Rule 10b-5 and the related Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 
Leidos teed up a significant set of issues because Item 303 concerns one of the 
more controversial corporate disclosures mandated by the SEC—an overview 
of known uncertainties facing a company’s financial future, which must be 
provided in the company’s “Management’s Discussion and Analysis” (MD&A). 
In an unusual twist to an already unusual case, the parties in Leidos announced 
a tentative settlement weeks before the Supreme Court was set to hear oral 
argument, and have successfully moved to hold the case in abeyance on the 
Court’s docket until the proposed settlement is ultimately rejected or 
approved.2 
Leidos was billed in both the briefing to the Supreme Court and academic 
commentary as a classic circuit split between the Ninth and Second Circuits. As 
detailed below, however, a careful reading of the precedents reveals that there 
is no genuine dispute among the federal courts. All of the relevant circuit court 
opinions agree that a violation of Item 303 may constitute a viable fraud claim 
under of Rule 10b-5 in some, but not all, circumstances. They also follow the 
same underlying reasoning for how those circumstances are to be determined, 
 
* Matthew C. Turk and Karen E. Woody are both Assistant Professors of Business Law at 
Indiana University’s Kelley School of Business. The authors would like to thank Brian 
Broughman, Donna Nagy, Christiana Ochoa and other participants at the Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law faculty workshop for their helpful comments.  
 1. See Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 
Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017).  
 2. Order in Pending Case, No. 16-581, 2017 WL 4622142 (Oct. 17, 2017). If the settlement 
is not approved by the Southern District of New York, Leidos will be back on the 
Supreme Court’s docket for the October 2018 term.  
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which turns on the applicable materiality standard for securities fraud. Leidos 
therefore left so little to be resolved that it was ripe for removal from the 
Supreme Court’s docket, even before news of a settlement was released, on the 
grounds that certiorari has been improvidently granted.  
The confusion surrounding Leidos is of broader importance for 
understanding the evolution of the Supreme Court’s securities law 
jurisprudence since John Roberts became Chief Justice in 2005. A consensus 
across the growing body of scholarship on that topic is that one of the salient 
features of the Roberts Court thus far is an uptick in the number of securities 
law cases taken up for review.3 Leidos highlights what is quickly becoming 
another defining characteristic: that the Roberts Court’s enthusiasm for 
granting certiorari on securities law petitions has been accompanied by a 
tendency to misapprehend the issues (or lack thereof) which those cases raise. 
This practice reflects an inefficient use of the Court’s scarce docket space. It also 
represents a missed opportunity to clarify the many areas of securities 
regulation that remain mired in doctrinal incoherence.  
I. Regulatory & Case Background 
A. Materiality Under Item 303 Versus Rule 10b-5  
 The Leidos case focused on the relationship between two SEC regulations: 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K and Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 implements the 
prohibition against securities fraud found in Section 10(b) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act. The rule provides that it is unlawful for any person to 
“make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading” in connection 
with the sale of a security.4 Since being promulgated by the SEC in 1942, the 
anti-fraud standard laid out in Rule 10b-5 has been the core enforcement 
mechanism in securities regulation. 
Rule 10b-5’s requirement that omitted or untrue information must relate 
to a “material fact” in order to be actionable was not precisely defined until 1976, 
when the Supreme Court held in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. that a fact 
will be considered material if it “would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
 
 3. Relevant entries in the growing literature on the Roberts Court’s securities law docket 
include Eric C. Chaffee, The Supreme Court as Museum Curator: Securities Regulation and 
the Roberts Court, 67 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 847, 848-49 (2017); John C. Coates IV, 
Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015); 
Eric Alan Isaacson, The Roberts Court and Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic 
Principles, 48 AKRON L. REV. 923, 924-26 (2015); A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the 
Roberts Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 106 (2011). 
 4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2016). 
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available.”5 In the 1988 case Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Court further refined this 
standard by articulating that a “probability-versus-magnitude test” must be 
applied when determining whether speculative or forward-looking 
information is material.6 Specifically, it held that “materiality ‘will depend at any 
given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will 
occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the 
company activity.’”7 
 Regulation S-K was adopted by the SEC in 1980 in order to synthesize the 
overlapping disclosure requirements that were provided under the 1933 
Securities Act (which covers initial offerings) and the 1934 Exchange Act 
(which calls for annual and quarterly disclosures on a periodic basis).8 Item 303 
of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of management’s subjective take on the 
state of the firm.9 In particular, Item 303 requires the identification and 
description of any “known trends or uncertainties” that management 
reasonably suspects will have a material effect on the company’s financial 
prospects.10 Because it not only aims to provide a window into management’s 
own thinking, but also appears to seek their prognostications about future 
events, Item 303 has been considered one of the more important and 
controversial disclosure rules that has been released by the SEC as part of 
Regulation S-K.11 
One year after Basic, in a 1989 interpretive release, the SEC explained its 
standard for materiality when considering the forward-looking information 
required by Item 303 by providing the following test:  
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty likely to come 
to fruition? If management determines that it is not reasonably likely to occur, no 
disclosure is required. (2) If management cannot make that determination, it must 
evaluate objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand, commitment, 
 
 5. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 6. 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988). 
 7. Id. (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)). 
 8. John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate over Company 
Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1145 (1995) (describing the widespread 
criticism of the “pointless duplication” in disclosure rules prior to Reg S-K). 
 9. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Suzanne J. Romajas, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: A Look at the 
Future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S245, S247 & n.15 (1993) 
(“Noncompliance with Item 303 denies investors access to the information that is most 
valuable to their investment decision. . . . Since investment decisions are inherently 
forward-looking, the importance of such information cannot be understated.”); Eric R. 
Harper, Comment, Unveiling Management’s Crystal Ball, 77 LA. L. REV. 879, 879-80 
(2017); Brian Neach, Note, Item 303’s Role in Private Causes of Action Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 741, 744 (2001) (calling the availability of 
MD&A-based allegations in Section 10(b) claims a potential “bullet in the [securities 
plaintiff] attorney’s revolver”). 
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event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come to fruition. Disclosure 
is then required unless management determines that a material effect on the 
registrant’s financial condition or results of operations is not reasonably likely to 
occur. 12  
The plain language of the Item 303 materiality standard departs noticeably 
from the probability-versus-magnitude formula set forth in Basic. In fact, the 
1989 SEC Release includes an explicit disclaimer that the Basic definition of 
materiality should be considered “inapposite” to Item 303.13 SEC officials have 
also opined that the Item 303 standard is slightly lower than that which applies 
to fraud claims under Rule 10b-5,14 and most academic analyses agree.15  
A consequence of the slightly lower materiality threshold for Item 303 is 
that it reduces the range of claims that private investors may bring based on 
firms’ incomplete disclosure of required MD&A information. That is because 
violations of Item 303 do not create any stand-alone private right of action.16 
The SEC can bring actions under either Item 303, Rule 10b-5, or both; yet 
investors are limited to the latter.17 This creates a gap, however theoretical, in 
which a hypothetical omitted disclosure could be material for purposes of 
Item 303 but not Rule 10b-5.18  
 
 12. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations, 54 Fed. Reg. 22427, 22430 (May 18, 1989). 
 13. Id. at 22430 n.27. 
 14. Edward H. Fleischman, Comm’r, SEC, The Intersection of Business Needs and 
Disclosure Requirements: MD&A, Address to the Eleventh Annual Southern Securities 
Institute (Mar. 1, 1991). 
 15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why 
the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 993-94 (1996); Mark S. Croft, MD&A: 
The Tightrope of Disclosure, 45 S.C. L. REV. 477, 483 (1994); Harper, supra note 11, at 
897; Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-
Enhanced Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 775 (1997) (“[T]he Commission’s MD&A 
requirement expressly rejects materiality as the threshold for disclosure of known 
trends or uncertainties. What comes in its place is a higher standard, though not much 
more determinate: disclosure is required only of trends and uncertainties that are 
‘reasonably likely to occur’ . . . .”); Neach, supra note 11, at 751-56. 
 16. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 287 (3d Cir. 2000) (making this point and citing a 
string of cases that have come to the same conclusion). 
 17. See Harper, supra note 11, at 894-900. For offering documents subject to Sections 11 
and 12, the SEC reviews disclosures before they become effective. Coffee, supra note 
15, at 1155-58. Likewise, for periodic disclosures subject to 10(b), such as 10-Ks, the 
SEC also can take administrative actions by issuing cease-and-desist orders that seek 
injunctive relief. Harper, supra note 11, at 894-96. 
 18. Douglas W. Greene, Why Item 303 Just Doesn’t Matter in Securities Litigation, LAW360 
(Oct. 13, 2015, 12:49 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/58WN-MAFJ (arguing that this 
distinction is of minimal practical significance for actual securities cases). 
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B. Leidos in the Lower Courts 
Leidos began as a federal securities class action filed in the Southern District 
of New York on February 22, 2012.19 The class plaintiff’s allegations arose from 
a contract entered into by SAIC (now doing business as Leidos, Inc.) and the 
City of New York (NYC) in 2001.20 Pursuant to that contract, Leidos 
committed to develop an automated workplace management system, CityTime, 
which was to be used by NYC’s administrative agencies.21 The initial budget for 
CityTime was $63 million, but SAIC ended up billing NYC $628 million for its 
work on CityTime.22 It eventually became clear, both internally at SAIC and to 
the NYC Bloomberg administration, that the inflated bill was due to an 
elaborate fraud by certain Leidos employees.23 Criminal charges were filed 
against CityTime personnel, NYC severed its business relationship with Leidos, 
and the entire project was ultimately a total loss.24  
Plaintiffs alleged that a SAIC 10-K of March 2011 omitted information 
required under Item 303’s MD&A rules, and therefore constituted securities 
fraud under Rule 10b-5.25 Specifically, the class asserted that SAIC knew of the 
extensive fraud that took place in connection with its CityTime project, and 
further knew that the fraud would have a material impact on the company.26 
Thus, plaintiffs contended that the potential fallout from the fraud should have 
been disclosed as a “known trend or uncertainty” pursuant to Item 303.27  
In the district court, plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed with prejudice for 
failure to adequately plead the materiality element required under 
Section 10(b).28 But the Second Circuit reversed in part and remanded the 
matter to the district court, explaining that “failure to comply with Item 303 . . . 
can give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5 so long as the omission is material 
under Basic . . . and the other elements of Rule 10b-5 have been established.”29 
In doing so, the Second Circuit opinion specifically referenced the SEC’s 1989 
 
 19. In re SAIC, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 12 Civ. 1353(DAB), 2013 WL 5462289 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 30, 2013). 
 20. Id. at *1-2. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at *11. 
 26. Id. at *10-11. 
 27. Id. at *11. 
 28. Id.; see also In re SAIC, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 12 Civ. 1353(DAB), 2014 WL 407050, at *1, 
4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2014). 
 29. See Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 94 n.7, 98 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2015)). 
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release on materiality under Item 303.30 Thus, the court of appeals made clear 
that “Item 303 imposes an ‘affirmative duty to disclose. . . . [that] can serve as 
the basis for a securities fraud claim under Section 10(b).’”31 
II. The Phantom Circuit Split  
 As framed in Leidos’ briefing to the Supreme Court, the case reflected “a 
deep split of authority with respect to one of the most important—and 
frequently invoked—provisions of the federal securities laws.”32 According to 
the petition for writ of certiorari,33 that split first materialized in a decision 
from 2015, Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, in which Judge Livingston’s 
opinion for the Second Circuit declared that its interpretation of the 
relationship between Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 was “at odds”34 with a Ninth 
Circuit case from the prior year, In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Regulation.35 
Because the Second Circuit in Leidos closely followed the reasoning set forth in 
Stratte-McClure, Leidos supposedly escalated this preexisting conflict among the 
federal appellate courts. In taking up Leidos, the Supreme Court presumably 
found the certiorari petition’s narrative compelling. That same narrative also 
reappeared substantively unchanged in the amicus briefing to the Court,36 
client updates released by major corporate law firms,37 academic legal blogs,38 
a leading securities casebook,39 as well as a number of scholarly articles.40  
There is something deeply odd about this consensus, though, because on 
the core legal question at issue in Leidos, the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit 
 
 30. Id. at 94.  
 31. Id. n.7 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 
101). 
 32. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., No. 16-581 (U.S. 
Oct. 31, 2016), 2016 WL 6472615. 
 33. Id. at 7. 
 34. Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103.  
 35. 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 36. See, e.g., Brief for the Securities Industry & Financial Markets Ass’n & Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, 
Leidos, No. 16-581, 2016 WL 7011426. 
 37. See, e.g., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Securities Litigation: U.S. Supreme Court Grants 
Certiorari to Decide Issue that Might Have Significant Impact on Registrants’ Exposure 
for Non-Disclosure of “Known Trends or Uncertainties” in SEC Filings 2-3 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/GQ8E-22RQ. 
 38. See, e.g., Audra Soloway et al., Paul Weiss Discusses Securities Fraud Liability Based Solely 
on Omissions, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/GAM6-KBLX. 
 39. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 611 (8th ed. 
2017).  
 40. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 11, at 900-08 (2017); Lauren M. Mastronardi, Note, Shining 
the Light a Little Brighter: Should Item 303 Serve as a Basis for Liability Under Rule 10b-5?, 
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 350-51, 354-59 (2016).  
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are in full agreement.41 A second look at the underlying precedents makes this 
clear. The relevant cases from both circuits follow an earlier Third Circuit 
opinion written by then-Circuit Judge Alito, Oran v. Stafford, and come to the 
same conclusion: A failure to comply with Item 303 may constitute a violation 
of Rule 10b-5 under some circumstances, but does not always automatically do 
so.42 A simple timeline of the unambiguous language from the holdings reflects 
this consensus:  
 
Oran, 226 F.3d 275, 288  
(3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J.) 
(quoting Alfus v. 
Pyramid Tech. Corp., 
764 F.Supp. 598, 608 
(N.D. Cal. 1991)) 
(emphasis added) 
“‘[A] violation of the disclosure requirements of 
Item 303 does not lead inevitably to the conclusion 
that such disclosure would be required under 
Rule 10b-5. . . .’ We . . . thus hold that a violation 
of SK-303’s reporting requirements does not 
automatically give rise to a material omission 
under Rule 10b-5.” 
NVIDIA,  
768 F.3d 1046, 1054-55 
(9th Cir. 2014) 
(emphasis added) 
“We are persuaded by [Oran’s] reasoning . . . what 
must be disclosed under Item 303 is not necessarily 
required under the standard in Basic.” 
Stratte-McClure, 
776 F.3d 94, 103-04  
(2d Cir. 2015) 
(emphasis added) 
“Oran is consistent with our decision that failure to 
comply with Item 303 in a Form 10-Q can give rise 
to liability under Rule 10b-5 so long as the 
omission is material under Basic, and the other 
elements of Rule 10b-5 have been established.” 
  
 
 41. Although a number of contributing factors may explain this confusion, the most likely 
proximate cause is an uncritical acceptance of Judge Livingston’s “at odds” statement, 
which ultimately rests on a misreading of the Ninth Circuit’s NVIDIA case. Compare 
Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Contrary to 
the Ninth Circuit’s implication [in NVIDIA] that . . . Item 303 violations are never 
actionable under 10b-5 . . . . our decision [holds] that failure to comply with Item 303 
in a Form 10-Q can give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5 so long as the omission is 
material under Basic . . .”), with In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (“Management’s duty to disclose under Item 303 is much broader than what 
is required under the standard pronounced in Basic. . . . Therefore, ‘[b]ecause the 
materiality standards for Rule 10b5 and [Item 303] differ significantly, the 
“demonstration of a violation of the disclosure requirements of Item 303 does not lead 
inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure would be required under Rule 10b-5.”’” 
(quoting Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000))). The “implication” that the 
opinion in Stratte-McClure attributes to the Ninth Circuit (and then purports to dispute) 
cannot be found in a fair reading of the NVIDIA opinion. 
 42. 226 F.3d at 288; see also Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103; NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1055.  
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Leidos, 818 F.3d at 94 
n.7 (quoting Stratte-
McClure, 776 F.3d at 
103-104) (emphasis in 
original) 
 “In Stratte-McClure . . . [w]e explained that ‘failure 
to comply with Item 303 . . . can give rise to 
liability under Rule 10b-5 so long as the omission 
is material under Basic.’” 
 
There are only two logical alternatives to the outcome announced in Leidos: 
either noncompliance with Item 303 constitutes a per se violation of Rule 10b-
5, or Item 303 provides a safe harbor, meaning that any “known trend or 
uncertainty” disclosure (or omission) would be immune from fraud claims. As 
the language referenced above indicates, none of the relevant federal court 
decisions have adopted either position.  
An unavoidable conclusion is that the circuit split which the Supreme 
Court was presumably on course to resolve does not in fact exist. Had the case 
remained on the Supreme Court docket, the Court likely would have summarily 
affirmed the Second Circuit decision in Leidos, and on the same grounds as were 
articulated in Judge Lohier’s opinion for the court in that case. The further 
upshot is that Leidos did not present any legal question worth addressing by the 
Supreme Court, and represents a case where, for all practical purposes, the writ 
of certiorari was improvidently granted.  
III. The Supreme Court’s Improvident Securities Law Docket 
 Leidos was the latest securities case for the Supreme Court under Chief 
Justice Roberts which, depending on how you count, has now issued roughly 
twenty securities-related decisions.43 As a result, there is a sizeable body of 
commentary that seeks to characterize these opinions. The three main trends 
which have been observed are: (1) an increase in the proportion of the Supreme 
Court cases that deal with securities law issues; (2) increased agreement among 
the justices in those cases; and (3) conservative (as in low-impact, rather than 
“pro-business”) decisions.44 Leidos not only encapsulates these trends but also 
points to a bigger-picture takeaway: that the Roberts Court is compiling a 
growing line of securities cases which should have avoided review in the first 
place.  
One only has to look as far back as the previous Court term to find another 
example of a securities law decision, Salman v. United States,45 that neither 
clarified nor altered the existing law. Salman, a case about a brother-in-law’s 
provision of stock tips, was anticipated to produce a blockbuster reformulation 
 
 43. See Chaffee, supra note 3, at 848. 
 44. See id. at 850-51; Coates, supra note 3, at 3-5; Isaacson, supra note 3, at 924-26; Pritchard, 
supra note 3, at 108-09. 
 45. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
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of insider trading law.46 But as it turned out, the Court issued an opinion that 
simply repeated a longstanding test and failed to clear the muddy waters of 
insider trading doctrine.   
Specifically, Salman argued that he was not guilty of insider trading because 
his brother-in-law, the tipper, had not received any financial benefit for the 
tip.47 Under Dirks v. SEC,48 a tippee may be held liable for insider trading, 
provided the tipper has received a “direct or indirect personal benefit from the 
disclosure.”49 Yet Dirks also made clear that a personal benefit can be inferred 
when the insider makes a “gift of confidential information to a trading relative 
or friend.”50 The facts of Salman involved a brother-in-law providing 
information; thus, the tipper-tippee relationship fell squarely within the 
definition of “relative or friend.”51 Unsurprisingly, the Court held unanimously 
that Salman was guilty of insider trading under the Dirks test,52 which, it should 
be noted, is a test that no lower court had attempted to abrogate. In other 
words, Salman was merely a reiteration of Dirks, and provided no insight or 
clarification on the elements of insider trading.53  
 
 46. See, e.g., All Eyes on Salman: The Supreme Court’s Newest Blockbuster Insider Trading Case, 
INSIDER TRADING & DISCLOSURE UPDATE, Aug. 2016, at 17, 17. Having recently denied 
a writ of certiorari in United States v. Newman, another insider trading case, the Court 
agreed to hear Salman, creating an appearance that a decision in Salman would clarify 
insider trading doctrine in a widely applicable manner. Id.; see also 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). 
The defendants in Newman were “several steps removed” from the corporate insider 
tippers, and their convictions were vacated by the Second Circuit because there was no 
evidence that either defendant was aware of the source of the inside information or that 
the insiders received any benefit for the disclosures. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 
438, 442-43 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 47. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423-24. 
 48. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 49. Id. at 663. 
 50. Id. at 664. 
 51. At the Circuit level, Salman attempted to use the Newman holding to argue that any 
exchange of information, even to a friend or family member, must include “at least a 
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” United States v. Salman, 792 
F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 
(2d Cir. 2014)). However, the facts of Newman did not include any family or close friend 
relationship among the tippers and tippees. See Newman, 773 F.2d at 442. In addition, 
the Newman court recognized that personal benefit is “broadly defined” and can include 
the “benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of confidential information to 
a trading relative or friend.” Id. at 452 (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 
(2d Cir. 2013)). 
 52. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424. 
 53. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
64, 72 (2016) (“Salman[] breaks no new ground and presents no issues that are either 
novel or complex.”); see also id. at 67, 71 (questioning “why the Supreme Court agreed 
to hear the case at all” . . . in light of the fact that the “familial relationship in Salman and 
the absence of such a relationship in Newman not only makes these cases easily 
reconcilable, it—along with the absence of a consequential personal benefit in Salman—
explains why both cases were correctly decided”). 
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Leidos and Salman are not the only securities cases where grants of certiorari 
by the Roberts Court turned out to be duds. Two other recent cases have been 
withdrawn prior to argument, because either the Court or the parties 
determined the issues were not worth litigating.54 In a 2014 case, Public 
Employees’ Retirement System v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., which asked whether filing a 
securities class action tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the class, 
the Court held—just one week prior to scheduled argument—that certiorari had 
been improvidently granted.55 And in 2013, the parties in UBS Financial Services, 
Inc. v. Union de Empleados de Muelles settled two months after certiorari was 
granted.56 
Along with the aforementioned cases, which had effectively zero impact, 
other recent entries on the Roberts Court docket have resulted in perfunctory 
unanimous decisions which intervene at the margins of securities law doctrine. 
For instance, in 2011, the Court held in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano that 
the statistical significance of omitted information in corporate disclosures is not 
required for establishing materiality or scienter.57 Likewise, in Jones v. Harris 
Associates, a 2010 opinion, the Court held that investment advisors violate their 
fiduciary duties if they charge disproportionately large fees.58 In a 2013 opinion, 
Gabelli v. SEC, the Court unanimously upheld the preexisting statute of 
limitations standard for securities fraud, but was required to overturn the 
Second Circuit’s opinion allowing the SEC to bring actions after the statute of 
limitations period tolled.59 All of these cases yielded Supreme Court opinions 
 
 54. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014); UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. v. 
Union de Empleados de Muelles, 134 S. Ct. 40 (2013). 
 55. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 135 S. Ct. at 42. 
 56. Union de Empleados, 134 S. Ct. at 40 (dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari on 
August 26, 2013); see also UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Union de Empleados Muelles, 133 S. 
Ct. 2857 (granting certiorari on June 24, 2013).   
 57. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 30-31 (2011); see, e.g., Decision in 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano Rejects Bright-Line Rule in Securities Fraud Action 
Based on Pharmaceutical Company’s Failure to Disclose Adverse Event, DAVISPOLK: CLIENT 
NEWSFLASH (Mar. 22, 2011), https://perma.cc/H5U5-JLGA (“The Court’s opinion[] . . . 
does not change the status quo regarding the standard for evaluating materiality and 
does not provide more definitive guidance to companies concerned with when and 
what to disclose . . . .”); Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Chalk One Up for the Ninth Circuit, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 24, 2011, 7:10 AM), https://perma.cc/XMB9-W48E (“In the 
end, . . . the opinion in this case is more likely to stand for its generous review of 
allegations in complaints than it is to make any important contribution to the substance 
of securities law.”). 
 58. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P, 559 U.S. 335, 346, 353 (2010); see, e.g., Supreme Court Decides 
Jones v. Harris Associates and Establishes Standard for Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Claims, 
ROPES & GRAY LLP (Mar. 26, 2010), https://perma.cc/3CSL-TF84 (“[I]t is expected 
that the decision will not fundamentally change the process by which boards of mutual 
funds review and approve advisor fees. . . . The Court acknowledged in today’s opinion 
that the standard it adopted has been the ‘consensus’ for over 25 years.”). 
 59. Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1224 (2013). 
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of various lengths, but likely could have been resolved on the papers with a per 
curiam decision.  
Of course, there is nothing wrong with reaffirming precedent, nor with 
agreement among the justices. But the specific form of agreement that has 
characterized recent securities law cases is disconcerting. Mainly, these 
decisions reflect that the significance of the petitions for certiorari was 
misapprehended at the outset. The result is that no real conflicts among the 
federal circuits are being resolved, and no open questions in the doctrine are 
being answered. 
Given the ever-shrinking docket of the Supreme Court, the cases surveyed 
above represent a clear misallocation of judicial resources. Moreover, that 
misallocation is particularly significant because there are contested doctrinal 
issues in securities regulation that need to be revisited. Often, the questions that 
are avoided are right under the Court’s nose in cases it has taken up. For 
example, there is line of precedents relating to Salman that present legitimate 
puzzles as to  what constitutes a “personal benefit,” a “gift,” or a “friend” under 
the Dirks test for insider trading, all of which call for the Court to provide 
guidance.60 Similarly, there is a genuine circuit split tangentially related to 
Leidos, over whether Item 303 omissions trigger a per se violation of Sections 11 
or 12 of the 1933 Securities Act (as opposed to Section 10(b) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act).61  
In short, given this Essay’s interpretation of Leidos and related Supreme 
Court opinions from recent years, the Roberts Court’s track record on 
securities law cases could be summed up in revisionist terms as: welcome 
enthusiasm, workmanlike decision-making, limited foresight. 
 
 60. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428-29 (2016) (noting that the question of 
what determines a personal benefit will be a difficult issue of fact for courts); United 
States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 61 (2d. Cir. 2017). In Martoma, the Second Circuit 
attempted to read the “close relationship” element out of the Dirks personal benefit test, 
stating that the “logic of Salman” indicates that “a corporate insider personally benefits 
whenever he ‘disclos[es] inside information as a gift . . . with the expectation that [the 
recipient] would trade’ on the basis of such information or otherwise exploit it for his 
pecuniary gain.” Id. at 61, 69 (alterations in original) (quoting Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428). 
In her dissent, Judge Pooler points out that the Martoma holding mirrored the 
government argument in Salman: a gift of confidential information to anyone 
constitutes securities fraud. Id. at 86-87. However, Judge Pooler stressed that the 
Supreme Court did not adopt that view in Salman and therefore did not expressly 
overrule the “meaningful close relationship” requirement of Newman or Dirks. Id. at 87. 
 61. Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, The Leidos Mixup and the Misunderstood Duty to 
Disclose in Securities Law, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).  
